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Book Review 
Richard Kearney and Kascha Semonovitch (eds.), 
Phenomenologies of the Stranger: Between Hostility 
and Hospitality (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2011), 256 pp. 
In Phenomenologies of the Stranger, Between Hostility and Hospitality, Richard 
Kearney and Kascha Semonovitch edits a collection of essays that truly 
spans the challenges and difficulties that pertain to questions of the stranger, 
the uncanny and the unfamiliar in Western thought. Though Jean Greisch’s 
essay is located in the last section of this compilation, one can argue that the 
following (quoted from his work) quite aptly sets the stage for the entire 
collection. “[In] what way and under what conditions the question of the 
stranger can become a properly philosophical one. How does the stranger 
enter into philosophy?” The collection is divided into four sections, each 
wrestling with different ways of approaching the challenge that Greisch 
raises. As such, we find four varied modulations of giving a 
phenomenological account of what, arguably, disrupts all 
“phenomenologizing.” Likewise, we are called to understand those scenes of 
hospitality, which involve the entry of otherness into “the same,” in terms 
that “signal a parallel threshold in inquiry itself” (263). As the book’s title 
aptly suggests, these essays give an account of the possibility of such 
hospitality, or of Western philosophical thought being host to that which 
does not have (perhaps because it cannot find) a home in the city of the 
Western thought. 
Section one of the book negotiates the concepts of place, site, borders 
and portals, both in their production of the stranger, and in their providing 
the conditions under which this stranger can be met with hospitality. In 
“Strangers at the Edge of Hospitality,” Edward Casey proposes that, in 
order to embody strangeness, the stranger necessarily comes into being at 
the edges of our world (of the city, or polis), those regions of life that “frame 
spaces for offering passage” (42). In this regard, though the stranger stands 
at the edges of our world, there exists the possibility of passage, or of 
passing through and onto a place in our world. Casey pursues the question 
of how this “passing through” takes place, and we see that this is a question 
of the possibility of extending hospitality toward the stranger. But before 
this, it is interesting to ponder his reading of the edge as that which is, 
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properly speaking, “in-between” places. In one sense, we might read this, 
along with Casey, as “the non-place” of the stranger. But there seems to be 
that other possibility, of reading the in-between as neither place nor the 
absence of place. At the edge, the stranger is not of us, unfamiliar, unknown, 
not in our place. But s/he also, somehow, beckons from the unsettling 
edges, and so crosses the familiar and the unfamiliar, very much like Freud’s 
and Heidegger’s formulation of the uncanny as “the stranger within.” This 
would set the tone for the last section of essays of the text, but it is note 
pointing out this interesting resonance.  
In any event, Casey determines that hospitality is the act of giving place 
to the stranger on the edge, and so must actually takes place at the edges of 
places. “It is a striking fact that hospitality as an event occurs at or on an 
edge. There is no hospitality in the open air just as there is no hospitality in 
general” (43). Interestingly enough, in the essay that follows, Brain Treanor 
attempts to “put hospitality in its place,” in the claim that “hospitality 
always happens in a place” (50). Its possibility rests in the hospitable one 
having a place, or occupying a place, and extending one’s hospitality from 
that place. The ground of Treanor’s argument seems to be that we must 
actually have a place to offer to the stranger, in order for hospitality to signify 
as such. His case is a strong one, but it stands juxtaposed to Casey’s call to 
encounter the stranger at the gate, or at the edge that is not quite yet a place. 
Nevertheless, both authors seem to agree that the stranger is the one without 
place (or, at the very least, in between places). The difference in accounts 
seems to lie in their interpretations of the “how to” of hospitality. Employing 
certain “linguistic components” of giving place to the stranger, Treanor 
argues that the role of hospitality lies in facilitating the guest in finding a 
home in the language of one’s place. The tone of Treanor’s claim is that this 
would entail more than leaving open the gates at the edges of our world, 
which is what Casey seems to suggest. According to Treanor, “to be at home 
in a language is to inhabit it in such a way that its idioms…feel natural and 
not forced” (64). My hospitality would then make the stranger “feel ‘as if’ 
she is at home” in my language (65). To be sure, he notes that such 
hospitality comes in degrees, and we could well imagine a disintegration to 
the extent that my language, my place, is made into the edge “in” which the 
stranger is, once again, fully displaced. Nevertheless, the directionality of 
Treanor’s account of performing hospitality seems opposed to Casey’s. 
While the latter has it that I venture out into the edge, Treanor holds that, 
outside of my place, hospitality cannot be performed. 
Section two is devoted to divine strangeness, and understand the divine 
as that which is always elsewhere, radically otherwise and excessive. To this 
end, the essays in section two continue the expositions of section one, except 
for their consistent emphasis on the performance of strangeness as a rupture 
of the self who is called to hospitality. John Caputo understands “God” to be 
“the name of undecidability itself,” and regards strangeness to represent 
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those limit-points of our human condition where “things fall apart,” 
including the very possibility of saying who we are (84-85). His exposition 
presents the divine as what approaches, always, as trouble, endangering  
that “safe circle of the same,” which provide the condition upon which I find 
myself in a world.  The “work” of the divine, from Caputo’s account, is 
somewhat estimated by what David Wood (“Things at the Edge of the 
World”) describes as fractalterity – the transformations and reversals of 
(familiar worlds) that occurs upon encountering the excesses of alterity. 
Indeed, along with Caputo, Wood identifies God as one of the many sources 
of this (ethical) reversal of my world. But while his conceptions of reversal 
and transformation seem to already point to some promised end result (new 
worlds, with new values and new mode of dwelling), Caputo’s exposition 
rests explicitly in the moment of disassembling, when the divine stranger 
comes in the form of a disturbance, and we put all at risk in our answering 
the call of that provocation. This risk seems to lie in the fact that we cannot 
know what lies ahead, in the aftermath of our being provoked, or of our 
being hospitable to trouble, and asking for trouble, “which is an excellent 
definition of prayer” (87). This is much like Kalpana Seshadri’s description 
of hospitality as a “remaining absolutely open to a non-predictable 
‘whatever’” (135). For Caputo, this undecidability or not knowing 
constitutes the radical risk that ensues in the moment of hospitality. It is to 
risk welcoming what is inherently “unwelcomable,” or to “love the 
unlovable.” Only then does the excess of the divine stranger accomplish the 
task of disturbing that “safe circle of the same.” To borrow from Christopher 
Yate’s essay in section four, “Derrida and Waldenfel on the Art of 
Hospitality,” “[order] triumphs otherness” (262). Hence, the alterity of 
divine strangeness is what would be diametrically opposed to the order of 
decision, knowing, and knowing what to expect.  
For Caputo, “welcoming the stranger involves a certain death to the 
self, [even though] hospitality is not supposed to be just plain suicide” (86). 
He situates hospitality to be a divestment of self, which nonetheless permits 
the self to remain to bear witness to its own rupturing. In section three of the 
book, Kelly Oliver’s essay identifies this very structure in Levinas’ 
conception of paternity. “[In paternity] the I breaks free of itself without 
ceasing to be I” (201). Like the other essays in this section, her analysis of 
maternal election finds the stranger to be inherent to the structures of 
identity, or as Simon Critchley’s account of Heideggerian uncanniness 
would have it, within the being of Dasein. It is we who are strange, or 
strangers to ourselves, which means that hospitality would consist in 
embracing or electing this “stranger within.” Oliver juxtaposes Kristeva’s 
account of motherhood alongside the relation that Levinas identifies 
between the father and the son, and determines that both take the self out of 
an egocentric “clock time” (what we might liken to Caputo’s “safe circle of 
the same”).  The father’s relation to the son opens for him an infinite time, 
while the mother’s relation to the child to which she gives birth directs her 
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to a “lost time.” According the Oliver, both “turn the self back to itself.” 
Hence, in place of a subjective potency, the father finds the purely un-
recognizable futuricity of the son. In place of her self-absorbed “wanting it 
all” (the love of her father and a return to her mother), the mother finds the 
miracle of her love for the child (a love that simultaneously embraces and 
releases that child).  
In this regard, Oliver’s presents hospitality as “the relationship with this 
uncanny other who is both me and not me” (208). In other words, hospitality 
concerns a comportment toward oneself as strange. Simon Critchley locates 
this in Heidegger’s ontological program, insofar as it “[brings] the human 
being face to face with its uncanniness” (145). Similar to Oliver’s description 
of the uncanny as that which is “both me and not me,” Critchley presents 
Heidegger’s conception of the call, which is “from me yet beyond me,” and 
calls me to (my) uncanniness (147). Heidegger names this “conscience,” and 
Critchley traces the implications of the concept for questions of the stranger 
and of hospitality. His reading of Heidegger is unmistakably Levinasian 
when he writes of man’s “unmasterable throwness” in being, or more 
specifically, of how that throwness generates a facticity that is a burden that 
we can never support. The call of conscience thrusts upon me (again, from a 
“within” that is also a “beyond”) the “nothingness of thrownness” and the 
“nothingness of projection,” between which I exist. Critchley points out that, 
in this sense, uncanniness is the “happening of action between these two 
nothings” (153). Dasein acts, which is to say that it is potency, but the call of 
conscience brings us to ourselves as an im-potency (insofar as our throwness 
is unmasterable). Critchley traces this impotency (vulnerability) back to our 
primordial indebtedness to fill the (double) lack constitutive our of being. 
There is no explicit mention of hospitality in Critchley’s account, but we are 
left to understand the appropriate (most authentic response) to this debt – to 
“choose oneself,” and not the collective “they” – functions as a hospitality to 
that which is most strange. 
Jean Greisch’s essay, “Being, the Other, the Stranger” also argues for a 
legitimately ontological engagement with the question of the stranger. He 
writes that “for Heidegger the ontological condition of possibility for the 
recognition of others as strangers is to accept the primary fact that existence 
itself is not reassuring” (225). His exposition comes in the last section of the 
book, and identifies certain anthropological and ethical axes alongside this 
ontological axis, through which such “recognition” might take place. Under 
the anthropological, we arrive at the signification of the stranger across the 
dichotomy of “near” (what is close and hand, culturally familiar, known) 
and “far” (remote, unreachable, culturally alien). This anthropological 
interrogation will be threatened by an ethnocentrism – “that repulsion when 
faced with ways of living, believing, and thinking alien to us” (218). 
Greisch illustrates that the ethical and ontological axes of inquiry 
actually intersect, insofar as ethical reflections on the stranger (she who 
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deflects the gathering attempts of logos) become duplicated in thinking 
strangeness ontologically. To be sure, the latter will be threatened by a 
logocentrism, which assembles everything so that all things can be 
discovered, or uncovered. Nevertheless, Greisch argues for a “going 
beyond” the opposition between an ethics of the stranger, and an ontology 
of the stranger. This is because the question of being can reveal the 
fundamental strangeness of being (this is clear from Critchley’s analysis of 
Heideggerian uncanniness). The experience of angst is the discovery that 
“being-in-the-world means always more than occupying a place or finding 
oneself ensconced somewhere” (225). In this sense, ontology can be the axis 
along which “thinking” (the hyper-phenomenality of the stranger) can 
genuinely take place. In this sense, logos does not gather into the field of a 
universal context the Levinasian face, but precisely makes way for the face 
to express, or to bear “meaning without context.” Christopher Yates also 
describes the hyper-phenomenality of the stranger in a similar sense. 
“[Strangeness] provokes sense without being meaningful (emphasis added)” 
(266). He names this provocation “pathos,” to capture the sense in which the 
self is affected by the encounter. Not only do I passively receive this 
provocation, but I am also powerless to determine the implications of being 
touched (pathos as “pathogen or perhaps a pathway to realizing a higher 
justice,” [267]). Here, Yates echoes the sentiments found in Caputo’s account 
of divine strangeness as undecidability and, as such, trouble (83-97). On 
Yates’ account, hospitality would be the disclosure of this disordering that 
results in a reconfiguration of the places that undergo the pathos of 
strangeness. “Hospitality is a topological and ontological recovery 
underway” (264). 
In the end, we are called to consider many modulations of the stranger, 
as well as what it means to extend hospitality toward that stranger. The 
stranger might be none other than ourselves, in which case hospitality 
would be an acknowledgement of the inevitable unease with which we 
navigate a tenuously familiar world. In that regard, what signifies as strange 
does so to the degree that it calls us out of comfort zones and modes of 
complacent intellectual dwelling. Hence, the value of the essays in this book 
rest in their being open to the possibility there is no “last word” on the 
phenomenology of the stranger, or to the possibility of the impossibility of 
“last words” in the vocation of thinking. 
Kris Sealey 
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